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Abstract 
 
Measuring the gain in income from migration is complicated by non-random 
selection of migrants from the general population, making it hard to obtain an 
appropriate comparison group of non-migrants. This paper uses a migrant lottery to 
overcome this problem, providing an experimental measure of the income gains from 
migration. New Zealand allows a quota of Tongans to immigrate each year with a 
lottery used to choose amongst the excess number of applicants. A unique survey 
conducted by the authors in these two countries allows experimental estimates of the 
income gains from migration to be obtained by comparing the incomes of migrants to 
those who applied to migrate, but whose names were not drawn in the lottery, after 
allowing for the effect of noncompliance among some of those whose names were 
drawn. We also conducted a survey of individuals who did not apply for the lottery. 
Comparing this non-applicant group to the migrants enables assessment of the degree 
to which non-experimental methods can provide an unbiased estimate of the income 
gains from migration. We find evidence of migrants being positively selected in terms 
of both observed and unobserved skills. As a result, non-experimental methods are 
found to overstate the gains from migration, by 9 to 82 percent. A good instrumental 
variable works best, while difference-in-differences and bias-adjusted propensity-
score matching also perform comparatively well. 
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1. Introduction. 
Is migration a good investment? To determine the income gains from migration, one must 
compare the earnings of the migrant to what they would have earned in their home 
country. The latter is unobserved, and is usually proxied by the earnings of stayers of a 
similar age and education to the migrant. This approach is not very convincing because if 
the two groups are really the same, they should have the same migratory behaviour 
(Lalonde and Topel, 1997). Simple comparisons of movers and stayers are therefore 
likely to be misleading, as differences in outcomes may just reflect unobserved 
differences in ability, skills, and motivation, rather than the act of moving itself. 
Recognizing this difficulty, economists often use statistical corrections for non-random 
selection when modelling outcomes for migrants (Robinson and Tomes, 1982). However, 
there is some doubt about the assumptions behind these statistical remedies for selectivity 
in non-experimental data (Deaton, 1997), especially when the odds of migrating are very 
low (Hartog and Winkelmann, 2003). These doubts persist because it is hard to know 
how well these remedies compare with the ideal of a randomized experiment. 
 
The research reported here uses a unique random selection mechanism to overcome the 
interpretation difficulties posed by the non-random selection of migrants, and then 
compares experimental estimates of the gains from migration to results obtained using 
non-experimental estimation methods. The random selection mechanism we use is based 
on the Pacific Access Category (PAC) under New Zealand’s immigration policy. The 
PAC allows an annual quota of Tongans to migrate to New Zealand without going 
through the usual migration categories used for groups such as skilled migrants and 
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business investors. Many more applications are received than the quota allows, so a 
lottery is used by the New Zealand Immigration Service to randomly select from amongst 
the registrations. A survey administered by the authors was used to collect data on 
winners and losers in this lottery. Thus, we have a group of migrants and a comparison 
group who are similar to the migrants, but remain in Tonga only because they were not 
successful in the lottery.  
 
By comparing   the lottery winners and losers, we are able to obtain the only known 
experimental measure of the gain in income from migration. As not all individuals whose 
names were selected in the lottery had migrated by the time of our survey, this estimate 
accounts for non-compliance to the “treatment” of migration. We therefore consider both 
the intention-to-treat effect, which is the impact on expected income of having a winning 
ballot in the PAC lottery, and the average treatment effect on the treated, which is the 
average impact of migrating for individuals who migrate after winning the lottery.  We 
estimate that there is an 88% increase in expected income from winning the lottery, and a 
263% increase in income from migrating. 
 
In addition to winners and losers in the PAC lottery, we also surveyed individuals who 
did not apply for the lottery. We use this sample of non-applicants along with the migrant 
sample to obtain non-experimental estimates of the income gains from migration. Five 
popular non-experimental methods for dealing with selectivity are considered: a single 
difference estimator which compares post-migration income to pre-migration income; 
OLS regression estimates which assume selection on observables; difference-in-
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differences regression estimation; propensity-score matching; and instrumental variables 
using the pre-existing migrant network and the pre-migration distance from the office in 
Tonga where ballot registrations are deposited as instruments. Each of these methods is 
found to overstate the gain in income from migration compared to the experimental 
estimate. Instrumental variables using a good instrument (pre-migration distance) 
performs best, only overstating the gains by 9%. The single-difference estimator 
overstates the gains by 25%, while difference-in-differences overstates the gains by 20%. 
Propensity-score matching overstates the gains by 19-33%, doing better when past 
income is included as a control and when the bias-adjusted methods of Abadie and 
Imbens (2005) are used. OLS overstates the gains by 31%, while a poor instrument (the 
size of the migrant network) overstates the gains by 82%, which is almost as large as the 
bias in the simple cross-country comparison of GDP per capita (100% overstatement). 
 
The existing empirical literature on migrant selectivity focuses exclusively on observable 
measures of skills, such as education. For example, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) find 
Mexican immigrants to the United States to be positively selected in terms of education 
and other observable skills. This contrasts with the model of Borjas (1987), which 
predicts that individuals moving from a country with a less equal income distribution to 
one with a more equal income distribution will tend to be negatively selected from their 
home country distribution. The Gini of weekly earnings from wage, salary and self-
employment work in Tonga is 0.338, compared to a Gini of 0.374 in New Zealand2, so 
Borjas’s model would predict positive selection from Tonga. The overstatement of the 
                                                 
2 Tonga Gini calculated from our sample of workers in non-migrant households; Gini for New Zealand 
calculated from the 2002 New Zealand Income Survey. 
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income gains from migration obtained from the non-experimental methods is consistent 
with this theory, if migrants from Tonga are positively selected in terms of unobserved 
ability and skills, conditional on their observed characteristics. We examine selection 
directly by looking at pre-migration earnings, and do find migrants to be positively 
selected in terms of unobserved characteristics, with most of this occurring through 
selection into the lottery, rather than through selective compliance conditional on winning 
the lottery.  
 
This paper also contributes to the literature started by the influential work of Lalonde 
(1986), which attempts to assess the ability of non-experimental estimators to obtain 
estimates similar to experimental results. To date, this literature has concentrated on a 
small number of labor market training programs. After Lalonde’s initial pessimistic 
assessment of non-experimental measures, there has been much recent debate as to the 
ability of propensity-score matching methods to obtain better results (e.g. Heckman, 
Ichimura and Todd, 1997; Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Smith and Todd 2005; Dehejia 
2005). The migration example we consider here offers many of the features identified by 
these studies as conducive to more accurate non-experimental estimation. The non-
migrant control group were administered the same survey instrument as the migrants, 
including retrospective earnings information, and live in the same villages and work in 
the same labor markets. Unlike in many labor program settings, there is no substitution 
bias, as the ability of the controls to migrate other than through the program we consider 
is severely limited. Moreover, the size of the “treatment” considered here is large and 
strongly significant. This contrasts with a treatment effect of a 29% increase in earnings 
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in Lalonde’s NSW male sample, which only had a t-statistic of 1.82. Even with these 
favorable conditions, the non-experimental estimators still overstate the income gains. 
However, we find that the more recent refinements of propensity-score matching do 
enable more precision, and provide point estimates which are not statistically different 
from the experimental estimator. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the immigration 
process used as the natural experiment and the sampling method and data from the 
Pacific Island-New Zealand Migration Study. Section 3 constructs the experimental 
estimates. Section 4 estimates five different types of non-experimental estimates. Section 
5 looks directly at selection, Section 6 considers cost-of-living adjustments and Section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. The Pacific Access Category and PINZMS Data  
The natural experiment we use is based on the Pacific Access Category (PAC) under 
New Zealand’s immigration policy. The PAC was established in 2001 and allows an 
annual quota of 250 Tongans to migrate to New Zealand without going through the usual 
migration categories used for groups such as skilled migrants and business investors. 
Specifically, any Tongan citizens aged between 18 and 45, who meet certain English, 
health and character requirements, can register to migrate to New Zealand.3 Many more 
applications are received than the quota allows, so a ballot is used by the New Zealand 
Immigration Service (NZIS) to randomly select from amongst the registrations. The 
                                                 
3 The person who registers is a Principal Applicant. If they are successful, their immediate family (spouse 
and children under age 18) can also apply to migrate as Secondary Applicants. The quota of 250 applies to 
the total of Primary and Secondary Applicants, and corresponds to about 70 migrant households. 
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probability of success in the ballot is approximately 10 percent. Thus, we have a group of 
migrants and a comparison group who are similar to the migrants, but remain in Tonga 
only because they were not successful in the lottery. Once their ballot is selected in the 
lottery, applicants must provide a valid job offer in New Zealand within six months in 
order to have their application to migrate approved and be allowed to migrate. 
 
The data used here are from the Tongan component of the Pacific Island-New Zealand 
Migration Survey (PINZMS), a comprehensive household survey designed to measure 
multiple aspects of the migration process. Questions on household demographics, 
education, labor supply, income, asset ownership and food consumption, were based 
where possible on the most widely used surveys in New Zealand and the Pacific Islands 
to enhance comparability. The survey design and enumeration, which was overseen by 
the authors in the first half of 2005, covered random samples of four groups: (i) Tongan 
migrants to New Zealand, who were successful participants in the 2002/03 and 2003/04 
PAC lotteries, (ii) successful participants from the same lotteries who were still in Tonga, 
either because their application for New Zealand residence was not approved (typically 
because of lack of a suitable job offer) or was still being processed, (iii) unsuccessful 
participants from the same lotteries who were still in Tonga, and (iv) a group of non-
applicants in Tonga. 
 
The initial sample frame for groups (i) and (ii) was a list of the names and addresses of 
the 278 (out of almost 3000 applicants) successful participants in the 2002/03 and 
 - 8 - 
2003/04 migration lotteries.4 Approximately 100 of these successful ballots had been 
approved for residence in New Zealand by the time of the survey, although some of those 
families had not yet moved to New Zealand. We managed to locate 65 of the families that 
had migrated, giving a sampling rate of over 70 percent. A variety of tracking methods 
were used to locate these families including contacting their family back in Tonga and 
using key informants in churches and other community groups. It was easier to draw a 
random sample of 55 of the successful ballots that had not yet migrated, because the 
NZIS records included postal and home addresses and telephone numbers in Tonga. This 
non-migrant group includes those whose applications were rejected and those whose 
applications were still being processed. We use the actual number of accepted and 
rejected applications to weight our sample. 
 
The initial sample frame for the unsuccessful ballots in the 2002/03 and 2003/04 lotteries 
(group (iii)) was a list of names and addresses provided by the NZIS. The details for this 
group were less informative than those for the successful ballots. Only a postal address 
was supplied and there were no telephone numbers. Thus, it was not possible to 
determine whereabouts in Tonga those with unsuccessful ballots lived. Moreover, many 
of the postal addresses were either for immigration agents, or were outside of Tonga 
(especially in New Zealand). We used two strategies to derive a sample of 78 
unsuccessful ballots from this information: first, as part of our survey of the migrants in 
New Zealand we had obtained details about the location of remaining family (almost 60 
percent of migrants still had family occupying their previous dwelling in Tonga). We 
                                                 
4 This was supplied under a contractual arrangement with the New Zealand Immigration Service, with strict 
procedures used to maintain the confidentiality of participants.  
 - 9 - 
used this information to draw a sample of unsuccessful ballots from the same villages 
(implicitly using the village of residence when the applicant entered the ballot as a 
stratifying variable). We also used the Tongan telephone directory to find contact details 
for people included in the list of names supplied by NZIS. To overcome concerns that 
this would bias the sample to more accessible areas around the capital city of Nuku’alofa, 
who are more likely to have telephones, we deliberately included in the sample 
households from two of the outer Islands, of Vava’u and ‘Eua. 
 
Table 1 examines how random the sample we have is by comparing means of ex-ante 
characteristics for lottery winners and lottery losers among the principal applicants in our 
sample. The point estimates of the means are similar in magnitude for the two groups and 
we can not reject equality of means for any of the variables. This is as would be expected 
with the random selection of ballots among applicants in the Pacific Access Category. 
 
The sample of non-applicants was obtained by selecting 60 households, with at least one 
member aged 18 to 45, in either the same villages that the migrants had been living in 
prior to migrating or in the same villages that unsuccessful ballots were found in. An 
initial screening question was used to check that no-one in the household had previously 
applied for the migration lottery. Data on employment, income, and demographics was 
collected on all members of these households. Additional questions on the reasons for not 
applying, the size of the family networks in New Zealand, and expectations, were asked 
of the oldest member aged 25-35 in the household, or of the oldest member aged 18-45 if 
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no one was aged 25-35.  We will refer to this group of individuals which received the 
extended questions as the group of pseudo-applicants. 
 
Table 2 presents the proportion employed, mean hours worked, and mean work income 
among the different groups in our sample. The mean weekly income from work among 
migrants is NZ$425, compared to $81-104 for applicants for the Pacific Access Category 
(PAC) lottery who did not migrate, and $41 among all individuals aged 18 to 45 in non-
applicant households.5 A t-test of equality of means strongly rejects the null hypothesis of 
equality of migrant income with any of the other groups. The point estimates suggest that 
migrants are more likely to be employed than non-migrants, and work slightly longer 
hours. However, these differences are not significant given our sample size.  
 
3. Experimental estimates of the income gain from migration  
3.1. Estimating treatment effects using experimental data 
This paper focuses on estimating the impact of migration to New Zealand on the income 
of Tongans. To determine the income gains from migration, one must compare the 
earnings of the migrant to what they would have earned in their home country had they 
not migrated. Typically, it is not possible to readily identify this unobserved 
counterfactual outcome. However, the PAC lottery system, by randomly denying eager 
migrants the right to move to New Zealand, creates a control group of individuals that 
should have the same outcomes as what the migrants would have had if they had not 
moved.  In our application, a comparison of mean income for lottery winners who 
migrate and lottery losers can be used to obtain an experimental measure of the gain in 
                                                 
5 At the time of the survey, NZ$1=US$0.72. 
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income from migration. This simple comparison of means at the bottom of Table 2 shows 
a $320 increase in weekly work income from migrating.  
 
As discussed in Heckman et. al. (2000), this simple experimental estimator of the 
treatment effect on the treated (SEE-TT) is biased if control group members substitute for 
the treatment with a similar program or if treatment group members dropout of the 
experiment. In our application, substitution bias will occur if PAC applicants who are not 
drawn in the lottery migrate to New Zealand through an alternative visa category such as 
the family or skills category or migrate to another country and dropout bias will occur if 
PAC applicants whose name are drawn in the lottery fail to migrate to New Zealand. We 
do not believe that substitution bias is of serious concern in our study, as individuals with 
the ability to migrate via other arrangements will likely have done so previously given the 
low odds of winning the PAC lottery6. However, as shown in Table 2, dropout bias is a 
more relevant concern; only one-third of lottery winning principal applicants had 
migrated to New Zealand at the time of our survey. A number of the other individuals are 
in the process of moving, but the majority of those not migrating are unable to move due 
to the lack of a valid job offer in New Zealand.  
 
The impact of dropout bias on the SEE-TT of the gain in income from migration 
estimated above can be illustrated by writing the income of applicant  i as: 
Incomei = α + β*BallotSuccessi + νi, where E(νi)=0,    (1) 
                                                 
6 We did not come across any incidences where remaining family members told us that the unsuccessful 
applicant had migrated overseas during our fieldwork. 
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BallotSuccessi is a dummy variable taking the value one if the PAC applicant’s ballot is 
drawn in the lottery and zero if it is not drawn, and alternatively as: 
Incomei = µ + λ*Migratei + εi,  where E(εi) = 0,     (2) 
where Migratei is a dummy variable taking the value one if person i migrates and zero 
otherwise, and λ is the average treatment effect on the treated.  
 
The SEE-TT of the gain in income from migration is calculated as the difference in mean 
income between lottery winners who migrate and unsuccessful ballots: 
SEE-TT = E[Incomei | Migratei=1] – E[Incomei | BallotSuccessi=0]   (3) 
However, from equation (2), we can see that: 
SEE-TT =  λ + E[εi | Migratei=1] – E[εi | BallotSuccessi=0]    (4) 
Thus, the SEE-TT will only be an unbiased estimate of λ if the last two terms in equation 
(4) sum to zero. Because ballot success is determined randomly via a lottery we can 
replace E(εi|BallotSuccess=0) with E(εi|BallotSuccess=1) and rewrite (4) to show that the 
SEE-TT is an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect on the treated if and only if: 
E[εi | Migratei=1] = E[εi | BallotSuccessi=1].       (5) 
 
That is, this simple estimator will give a consistent estimate of the income gains from 
migration if and only if there is no selection as to who migrates among those successful 
in the lottery. This condition does not seem likely to hold, and in this case estimating the 
impact of migration requires comparison of other groups. 
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3.2. Intention-to-treat effect 
Experimental data, in the presence of substitution and dropout bias, can identify the mean 
impact of a program (eg. winning the lottery) on outcomes (eg. income for PAC 
applicants), also known as the intention-to-treat effect (ITT).7 This estimator, β in 
equation (1), is unbiased because randomisation insures that E(νi | BallotSuccessi=1) 
equals E(νi | BallotSuccessi=0), and can be computed by comparing the mean income for 
ballot winners to that for ballot losers. As shown at the bottom of Table 2, on average, 
winning the PAC lottery is estimated to increase weekly income by $91. 
 
While the results in Table 1 show that the lottery did indeed achieve reasonably 
comparable groups, the small size of our sample may have resulted in some differences 
between successful and unsuccessful ballots. To improve the efficiency of our ITT 
estimate, we re-estimate β using an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model 
described in equation (6) to add control variables for the observable pre-existing 
characteristics of the two groups: 
Incomei = α + β*BallotSuccessi  +  δ’Xi + ωi      (6) 
 
Column 1 of Table 3 first estimates this regression with no controls, repeating the 
estimate of $91 obtained as the difference in means. In Column 2 we add a set of controls 
for pre-existing characteristics of applicants. These include standard wage equation 
variables, such as age, sex, marital status, and years of education. In addition, we include 
                                                 
7 The terminology Intent-to-treat comes from the medical literature, and refers to analysis based on the 
original random assignment of individuals to treatment or control groups, regardless of whether or not 
individuals actually received or complied with the treatment. In our context, it gives the impact of 
assignment to migration status through the lottery, regardless of whether individuals who win the lottery 
actually migrate or not. 
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height as a pre-existing measure of health, and whether or not the applicant was born on 
the main island of Tongatapu, as a measure of having more urban skills. The addition of 
these controls reduces the size of the estimated effect only slightly, to $90, which is not 
significantly different from that obtained without controls. Column 3 controls further for 
past income, which is expected to also capture the effect of a host of unobserved 
individual attributes that determine income. The addition of this term only marginally 
changes the estimated intent-to-treat effect, which is now estimated to be $87. The fact 
that the estimated program effect changes only slightly in magnitude as we add the 
controls is consistent with the result in Table 1, which showed that the lottery succeeded 
in randomizing these controls across applicants and non-applicants. 
 
3.3 Average treatment effects 
These unbiased estimates of the ITT are substantially smaller than the biased estimate of 
the SEE-TT both because many individuals in the treatment group actually fail to receive 
the treatment (eg. migrate) and because of the potential dropout bias arising from non-
random migration among those who do win the lottery. Heckman et. al. (2000) 
demonstrate that under the following assumptions: 1) lottery losers do not substitute for 
the migration treatment, 2) dropouts among the lottery winners are unaffected by winning 
the lottery, and 3) dropouts among the lottery winners have the same mean outcome as 
lottery losers who would have been dropouts if they had won the lottery; an unbiased 
estimate of the average treatment effect on the treated can be calculated which is adjusted 
for dropout bias (ADJ-TT): 
ADJ-TT = ITT / p         (7) 
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where p is the proportion of lottery winners who migrate. (eg the proportion of non-
dropouts). Using the ITT of $90.63 from column 1 in Table 2 and p=0.33 we can 
calculate that migrating increased the weekly work income of Tongans by $274.  
 
Instrumental variables provide another approach for estimating average treatment effects 
with experimental data Returning to equation (2), we can consistently estimate λ if an 
excluded instrument exists which is correlated with whether an individual migrates, 
Migratei, and is uncorrelated with the error term in this equation, εi.  In our application, 
the PAC lottery outcome can be used as an excluded instrument because randomization 
ensures that success in the lottery is uncorrelated with unobserved individual attributes 
which might also affect income and success in the lottery is strongly correlated with 
migration (the first stage F-statistic is 61.5).8  This estimate of λ is called the local 
average treatment effect (IV-LATE) and can be interpreted as the effect of treatment on 
individuals whose treatment status is changed by the instrument. In our application, this 
is the effect of migration on the income of individuals who migrate after winning the 
lottery. Angrist (2004) also demonstrates that in situations where no individuals who are 
assigned to the control group receive the treatment (eg. there is no substitution) then the 
IV-LATE is the same as the average treatment effect on the treated (IV-TT). In models 
with no covariates this also equals the ADJ-TT (Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996).  
 
                                                 
8 Validity of the instrument also requires that the lottery outcome does not directly affect incomes 
conditional on migration status. One could conceive of stories such as that winning the lottery and not 
being able to migrate causing frustration which leads individuals to work less, or conversely, winning the 
lottery acts as a spur to work harder in order to afford the costs of trying to find a job in New Zealand. 
However, such possibilities were not encountered in our field work, and as is seen in Table 2, income of 
non-migrants among the successful ballots is very similar to income of the unsuccessful ballots. This gives 
us reason to believe the instrument is a valid one. 
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Column 4 of Table 3 reports the IV-TT estimator when no other controls are included in 
the regression model, and estimates a gain in weekly work income of almost $274 from 
migrating, which is identical to the estimate above based on the ITT/p formula. Column 5 
then adds the same control variables used above when estimating the ITT; the estimate 
increases slightly to $281. Column 6 adds past income as a further control, measured here 
as self-reported income from 2003. Past income is likely to capture a host of unobserved 
attributes of individuals which affect labor market performance and the likelihood of 
migrating conditional on winning the lottery, and is seen to be strongly significant. Each 
additional dollar of past income in 2003 is associated with 66 cents higher wage income 
today. Adding past income as a control results in an estimated income gain from 
migration of $274 per week. This is the same as was obtained in the model with no 
covariates, and confirms that randomization succeeded in making ballot success 
orthogonal to the other variables. 
 
Therefore, after controlling for observable differences remaining after randomization, we 
estimate that a successful ballot increases expected income of PAC applicants by $91 per 
week, while migrating increases mean income by $274. Given that mean income of 
applicants with unsuccessful ballots is $104, this represents a 88% increase in expected 
income from winning the lottery, and a 263% increase in income from migrating. 
 
4. Non-experimental estimators 
The natural experiment provided by the use of a lottery to admit Pacific Islanders to New 
Zealand provides a unique opportunity to estimate the gain in income from migration. 
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Other studies of migration are forced to use non-experimental methods to attempt to deal 
with the selectivity issues associated with migration, comparing the incomes of migrants 
to that of non-migrants of similar observable characteristics. In this section we explore 
how well such methods work in practice, comparing the results obtained from different 
non-experimental methods to the experimental results described above. 
 
This approach for studying the validity of non-experimental methods has a long history in 
the labor program evaluation literature. For example, in perhaps the first attempt to do so, 
Lalonde (1986) compared experimental estimates from the National Supported Work 
(NSW) Demonstration to non-experimental results calculated using control groups 
created from household survey data.  For this program and treatment, Lalonde found that 
non-experimental methods did a poor job of replicating the experimental results. 
Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997), Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and Smith and Todd 
(2005) each further exploit the data collected for the NSW to examine whether particular 
refinements to non-experimental methods can lead to a better replication of the 
experimental results.   
 
In summary, these papers demonstrate that more accurate non-experimental estimates can 
be achieved if the treatment and non-experimental control groups are: i) compared over a 
common support (eg. the distribution of the likelihood of receiving the treatment is 
similar in both groups), ii) located in the same labour markets, and iii) administered the 
same questionnaire (eg. data is collected from both groups in an identical manner). A 
significant improvement can further be achieved if data is collected from both the pre- 
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and post-treatment periods and a ‘difference-in-differences’ estimator is used to control 
for unobserved differences between the treatment and control groups by differencing out 
individual fixed effects which are correlated with both the outcome and the likelihood of 
being treated. Nonetheless, even with these refinements, Smith and Todd (2005, p.305) 
conclude, “Our analysis demonstrates that while propensity score matching is a 
potentially useful econometric tool, it does not represent a general solution to the 
evaluation problem.” 
 
Recall that PINZMS collects data for a sample of non-applicants to the lottery selected 
from either the same villages that the migrants had been living in prior to migrating or in 
the same villages that unsuccessful ballots were found in and administers them an 
identical questionnaire to the one given to other non-migrants in our sample (eg. the 
experimental control group). Thus, these individuals serve as a perfect non-experimental 
control group on which to test alternative methodologies for estimating the gains from 
migration. As discussed above, all individuals in our sample report their income from the 
previous year allowing us to also implement a ‘difference-in-differences’ estimator. 
 
Before proceeding with microeconomic non-experimental estimators, it is worth 
comparing the experimental estimate of the income gains to the cross-country macro 
estimator. Cross-country studies of the determinants of migration often use differences in 
per capita national income as proxies for the income gains from migration (e.g. Clark, 
Hatton and Williamson, 2002). In 2004, New Zealand’s GDP per capita was NZ$30,469, 
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while Tonga’s was NZ$2,044.9 This difference in GDP per capita therefore equates to 
NZ$546 per week, or twice as large as the actual gain experienced by the average migrant 
in our survey. 
 
4.1. The Single Difference Estimator 
We begin by examining whether a simple single difference estimate calculated using only 
information from the migrant group provides a good estimate of the income gains from 
migration. Several recent surveys of new immigrants (eg. the Longitudinal Immigrant 
Survey: New Zealand (LisNZ); and the New Immigrant Survey (NIS) in the U.S.) ask 
about income prior to migration. Thus, one approach to estimating the average income 
gain from migration is to calculate the mean difference between the migrant’s pre-
migration and post-migration incomes. That is, the estimate is: 
λSD = E[Incomei,t – Incomei,t-1 | i migrating between t and t–1]                   (8) 
Adding time subscripts and control variables to equation (2), and assuming that slope 
coefficients do not change over time, we have: 
Incomei,t = µt + λ*Migratei,t  + π’Xi,t + ηi,t      (9) 
 
Then we see that: 
λSD  = (µt - µt-1) + λ + E[π’(Xi,t – Xi,t-1)]      (10) 
 
There are two possible sources of bias in such an estimate. Firstly, if individuals on 
average change their attributes, such as experience, or education, then we would expect 
                                                 
9 Source: World Bank GDF and WDI Central (August 2005 update) for population and GDP. The exchange 
rate of 1 pa’anga to 0.729 NZ$ prevailing at the time of our survey was used to convert Tongan GDP per 
capita to New Zealand dollars. 
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their incomes to change over time and so the third term to be non-zero. Secondly, if there 
are overall macroeconomic movements, mean income for those not migrating will differ 
from one period to the next. This re-emphasizes the fact that the counterfactual one 
would ideally like is what a given individual would be earning in the current time period 
if he or she didn’t migrate; this could be different from what they earned before migration 
due to macroeconomic factors or changes in the income-earning potential of the 
individual over time. A third potential form of bias when it comes to estimation is that 
previous income is likely to be subject to greater recall error than current income. 
 
The first row of Table 4 provides the estimate λSD, calculated as the difference between 
the current income of our migrant sample and what they reported earning prior to 
migration. Based on this method, we would estimate an income gain of $341. Comparing 
this to columns 4 and 6 of Table 3, we calculate that this method results in estimated 
income gains which are 25% higher than the experimental estimate.  
 
We can examine the magnitude of the first source of bias in this estimator by examining 
the increase in income that occurred for the unsuccessful ballots, who remained in Tonga. 
Mean income increased $28 per week for this group, which accounts for 42 percent of the 
difference in income gains estimated via this method compared to the experimental 
estimates.  
4.2. OLS 
A second non-experimental method commonly used to estimate the returns from 
migration is to assume that all differences between migrants and non-migrants which 
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affect income are captured by the regressors in an OLS regression. One then estimates λ 
through the following regression: 
Incomei = κ + λ*Migratei  + π’Xi+ υi      (11) 
 
We estimate equation (11) by combining the sample of migrants in New Zealand with the 
sample of non-applicants in Tonga. We do this for two samples in Tonga. One individual 
from each household of non-applicants was asked a longer set of questions, including 
information on their family networks in New Zealand, expectations about the future, and 
other broader issues. This was done for the group of pseudo-applicants, consisting of the 
oldest member aged 25 to 35 in the non-applicant household (or oldest member aged 18-
45 if the household did not have a 25 to 35 year old). The first sample we use combines 
these individuals with the migrants. The second sample uses all individuals aged 18 to 45 
in the non-applicant households. The set of controls used in equation (11) are the same as 
used above, and include age, education, marital status, sex, birthplace and height.  
 
Table 4 shows that this results in an estimated income gain from migration of $384 using 
the restricted sample, and an income gain of $360 using the wider sample. Appendix 1 
provides the full regression results. Comparing these with the experimental estimates, we 
see that the restricted sample overestimates the income gain by 40% and the full sample 
overestimates the income gain by 31%. The direction of this bias is consistent with the 
view that migrants have more drive or greater labor market ability than non-migrants. 
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Column 2 of Appendix 1 repeats this regression for the full-sample of 18 to 45 year olds 
without including any of the X variables as controls in equation (11). The coefficient on 
migration is $386. Adding the observable characteristics as controls in column 3 reduces 
this to $360, showing positive selection on observables. However, the change in the 
migration coefficient from adding these controls is not significant, and their addition only 
reduces the overestimation of the income gains from 41% to 31%. It therefore seems that 
most of the OLS bias is due to selection on unobserved characteristics.   
 
4.3. Difference-in-Differences 
Using self-reported past income, we can also control for time invariant individual 
attributes which affect labor market income via difference-in-differences regression. 
Since we do not have panel data on all the control variables, we estimate the following 
version of the difference-in-differences regression : 
Incomei - PastIncomei= κ + λ*Migratei  + π’Xi+ υi     (12) 
 
Controlling for past income lowers the estimated income gain to $375 using the restricted 
sample and $328 using the wider sample. Columns 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 provide the 
full set of coefficients. These estimates are now respectively 37% and 20% higher than 
the experimental estimate, although given our sample sizes, we can only reject equality 
with the experimental estimate for the narrower sample. There are two main possible 
sources of remaining bias. The first is that unobserved characteristics like drive and 
ability may be rewarded differently in the New Zealand and Tongan labor markets, so 
that individual effects are time-varying. The second is that we are comparing migrants to 
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not-very-similar non-migrants, and so the assumption of a common underlying trend in 
labor income is not tenable. The latter assumption is eased by using the wider sample, 
and can be relaxed further by ensuring that the migrants are compared to sufficiently 
similar non-migrants, which the next method attempts to do. 
 
4.4. Propensity-Score Matching 
Propensity-score matching is perhaps the non-experimental evaluation technique which 
has attracted most research interest in recent years, with proponents claiming that it can 
replicate experimental benchmarks when appropriately used (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; 
Dehejia 2005). Estimation takes place by first estimating a probit equation for the 
probability of migrating, and then matching each migrant to non-applicants with similar 
predicted probabilities of migration. This enables migrants to be compared to individuals 
who are similar in terms of observed characteristics. Once the matches are constructed, 
the gain in income is calculated as the mean income for migrants less the mean income 
for the matched sample. We use the nearest-neighbor matching, and following Abadie et 
al. (2001) match each migrant to the four nearest neighbors. 
 
Our base specification uses the same set of control variables as used in the regression 
analysis to form the match. The existing literature (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997; 
Smith and Todd, 2005) have noted that difference-in-difference matching estimators can 
perform substantially better than cross-sectional matches. While we do not have panel 
data on all matching variables, the inclusion of past income allows us to obtain estimates 
similar in spirit to difference-in-difference matching. Figure 1 then shows kernel densities 
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of the propensity scores when past income is included alongside the other regression 
controls in forming the match. Note that there is considerable overlap in the distributions, 
with some migrants and some non-applicants in almost all the range. The propensity 
score for the migrant group ranges from 0.069 to 0.947, while that of the non-applicant 
comparison group ranges from 0.000 to 0.789. Estimation is restricted to the area of 
common support, where the two distributions overlap. 
Figure 1: Propensity Scores for Migrants and Non-migrants 
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One potential criticism is that these base specifications are relatively parsimonious, using 
only 6 or 7 covariates to form the match. This is in large part due to the need to use 
retrospective questions and time invariant attributes to form the match, since the survey 
was cross-sectional. To investigate the robustness of the matching results to a more 
flexible specification, we also estimated the propensity score allowing for interactions of 
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sex with each of the other covariates, quartics in age and years of schooling, and an 
interaction between age and education, for a total of 19 covariates.  
 
For each of these three specifications of variables used to form the match we calculate the 
sample average treatment effect (SATE) and sample average treatment effect for the 
treated (SATT) following Imbens (2004). Table 5 reports these estimates in rows A, B 
and C. 10 Once we control for past income, the SATE and SATT are very similar to one 
another. We focus on the SATT, since this is more directly comparable to the 
experimental treatment effect estimated using the migration lottery as an instrument for 
migration.  
 
Under the basic specification, the estimated income gain is $364 per week, 33% higher 
and significantly different from the experimental estimate of $274. Adding past income 
as a control lowers the bias to 28.5% and adding interactions reduces it to 27.4%. The t-
statistic for testing equality of the treatment effect in model C with the experimental 
estimate is 1.61, close to the margin of being able to reject equality at the 10% level of 
significance.  
 
However, Abadie and Imbens (2005) show that matching estimators are in general not 
root-N consistent when more than two continuous covariates are used for the matching. 
Intuitively as more covariates are used, it becomes more difficult to obtain a close match 
to the treated observation. This results in a conditional bias term of stochastic order N-1/k, 
where k is the number of continuous matching variables. They propose a bias-corrected 
                                                 
10 Propensity-score matching was estimated in STATA using the routine described in Abadie et al. (2001). 
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matching estimator which corrects for this and is root-N consistent. Our base model in A 
has 3 continuous covariates (age, education and height), while the model with 
interactions in C has 14 continuous covariates. We therefore implement the bias-
correction and report the bias-adjusted SATT in Table 5.  
 
The bias-adjustment brings the matching treatment effects closer to the experimental 
estimate, and we can no longer reject equality. In model C, with interactions, the bias is 
reduced from 27.4% to 19.9%. Dehejia (2005) notes that sensitivity of the matching 
estimator to small changes in the specification used is one diagnostic as to the quality of 
the comparison group. The bias-adjusted estimators are not that sensitive to the particular 
specification used for matching, ranging from $329 to $346 per week as the estimated 
income gain. Based on this, one would therefore be likely to conclude that the matching 
technique is working reasonably well in this context, even without reference to the 
experimental data. 
 
Rows D and E of Table 5 conduct two other robustness tests suggested by the literature. 
The first is to not only estimate the matching estimator over the area of common support, 
but also to examine robustness to trimming observations in the support with very low or 
very high probabilities of being selected. Panel D trims propensity scores which are less 
than 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 and 0.15 or greater than 0.99, 0.95, 0.90 and 0.85 respectively. After 
the bias-adjustment, the estimated treatment effect is not very sensitive to such trimming, 
resulting in a bias of 18.9 to 20.1 percent. The second robustness test examines the 
sensitivity of the estimator to the number of neighbors used in forming the match. This 
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trades bias for efficiency, which is seen in the smaller standard errors when more 
neighbors are used. Again the point estimates are very robust to this choice of 
specification, and result in a 20% higher income gain than is estimated by the experiment.  
 
Is there a  pre-migration-lottery earnings dip? 
In studies of labor training programs, Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and Dehejia 
and Wahba (2002) note the importance of including information on labor force histories 
in estimating the probability of participation when using matching estimators. A 
particular concern in evaluating labor training programs is the dip in earnings often 
observed prior to participation in such programs (Ashenfelter, 1978). For this reason, 
Dehejia (2005) stresses that two or more years of pre-treatment earnings are desirable for 
use in matching.  We only measure income for one period prior to migration for the 
migrants in our sample, and so are unable to use two or more periods of pre-lottery 
earnings in our matching. We do, however, have several years of labor histories for the 
sample observed in Tonga, and so can investigate whether there is a dip in earnings prior 
to applying for the migration lottery by looking at earnings of lottery losers. 
 
After deflating by the Tongan Consumer Price Index to convert earnings into March 2002 
pa’anga, we find that applicants to the lottery were experiencing very moderate income 
growth in the run-up to their application for the lottery. Mean real weekly income was 
T78.78 in 2002, T81.98 in 2003 and T84.46 in 2004. This may still represent an earnings 
dip compared to the counterfactual of not-applying for the lottery if the economy as a 
whole is growing. Therefore, to rule this out, we match lottery losers to non-applicants on 
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the basis of the same set of basic controls used in specification A in Table 5, along with 
real weekly work income in 2002 and 2003. We then can ask whether individuals who 
would apply for the lottery in early 2005 had lower income in 2004 than similar 
individuals, with similar incomes in 2002 and 2003, who did not apply for the lottery. 
The estimated mean difference in weekly income in 2004 from this match is –1.63 
pa’anga, with a standard error of 11.35. This is statistically insignificant and amounts to 
less than 2 percent of mean weekly income in 2004 of lottery applicants.  Therefore it 
appears that we can rule out a pre-migration lottery dip in earnings. Hence the matching 
estimators presented in Table 5 should not be greatly affected by the use of one rather 
than two year’s pre-treatment earnings. 
 
4.5. Instrumental Variables with a Non-experimental instrument 
Like the regression approach, propensity score matching relies on selection on 
observables, so will overstate the income gains if migrants are more talented or have 
more drive than observationally similar non-migrants.  An alternative approach to non-
experimental estimation of the impact of migration explicitly recognizes that migrants are 
likely to be non-randomly selected, even conditioning on observables, and so attempts to 
find instruments for migration. An example is Munshi (2003), who uses rainfall in 
Mexican villages as an instrument for migration when looking at the effect of migration 
networks on job outcomes in the United States. Given the small size of Tonga, weather 
variation does not provide an instrument in our application. We instead consider two 
potential instruments, with varying likelihoods of the exclusion restriction being satisfied. 
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Several studies looking at the impact of migration on the sending country have employed 
historic migration networks (e.g. Woodruff and Zenteno 2001, McKenzie and Rapoport 
2004). In our context it is likely that having a large network of relatives in New Zealand 
helps predict whether an individual migrates, and so we consider the effect of using the 
total number of types of relatives an individual has in New Zealand as an instrument for 
migration. This is strongly correlated with migration (first-stage F-statistic is 14.3). 
However, we would be highly concerned that the exclusion restriction is violated for this 
instrument, since many individuals in our survey said they found their first job in New 
Zealand through relatives. 
 
We investigate this by estimating equation (11) using the migrant network as an 
instrument for migration, restricting analysis to the sub-sample for which we have 
information on their network. Table 4 and column 6 of Appendix 1 show that this results 
in an estimate of the income gain from migration of $499, which is 82% higher than the 
experimental estimate. Thus using a poor instrument results in a bias almost as large as 
the cross-country estimator. 
 
A valid instrument is a variable which predicts whether or not people apply to migrate, 
but doesn’t otherwise affect their labor market outcomes if they move to New Zealand. 
Our survey asked eligible individuals who didn’t apply for the Pacific Access Category 
why they didn’t apply. The most important reason given for not applying was that they 
did not know the requirements, which 98% of non-applicants listed as a very important 
reason for not applying. A distant second among the other reasons given was that they 
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didn’t think the chances of getting selected in the lottery were very high, which 12% 
listed as very important, and a further 60% gave as somewhat important. 
 
This motivates our choice of an alternative potential instrument, which is based on how 
close the individual’s house in Tonga is to the New Zealand Immigration Service (NZIS) 
office. Information about the requirements of the Pacific Access Category is obtained 
from this office, and the applications have to be delivered there. GPS coordinates were 
taken of each of the households in our survey, and of the NZIS office location, and based 
on these, the (log) of the distance between each household and the NZIS office was 
calculated.11  
 
Comparing migrants to non-applicants, we find log distance to be a very strong predictor 
of migration, with a first stage F-statistic of 21.9.  Row 5 in Table 4 and column 7 of 
Appendix 1 show the resulting estimate of the income gains from migration using log 
distance as an instrument. The estimated gain is $305, which is 11% higher than the 
experimental estimate. Since migration status is a binary variable, an alternative approach 
to the two-stage least squares (2SLS) model is to use full information maximum-
likelihood (FIML) to estimate a treatment effects model with an endogenous binary 
                                                 
11 A possible threat to the exclusion restriction needed for distance to be a valid instrument is that 
individuals who lived further away from the NZIS office would have lived in more isolated, less urban 
areas. If this makes them less able to adapt to city life in New Zealand, then we would expect an upward 
bias in the IV estimator, since it would be in part capturing the returns to more urban experience. To 
investigate this possibility, for the group of migrants in New Zealand we regressed income on our set of 
controls, including past income, and log distance. The coefficient on log distance is positive (9.0) and 
insignificant (p-value of 0.76). Thus there is no strong effect of living in a location closer to the NZIS 
office in Tonga on labor income, and if anything, migrants that lived further away earned slightly more in 
New Zealand. Based on this it is likely that one would conclude that this was a reasonable instrument, even 
without reference to the experimental comparison. 
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treatment.12 Column 8 in Appendix 1 shows the models coefficients are similar to those 
from 2SLS. Row 6 of Table 4 shows a slight reduction in the estimated gain from 
migration, down to $298, which is only 9% higher than the experimental estimate. 
 
5. Exploring Selection Directly 
The non-experimental methods all overestimate the income gains from migration 
compared to the estimate obtained from the lottery. This suggests that lottery applicants 
are positively selected in terms of unobserved individual characteristics which determine 
labor market earnings. Selection could occur both in terms of the decision to apply for the 
lottery, and the decision to migrate conditional on winning the lottery. We examine here 
the evidence for each type of selection. 
 
We first examine the overall extent of selection by comparing the pre-migration income 
of migrants to that of observationally similar non-applicants via the following regression: 
Incomei,t-1 = α + β*Migranti,t + γ’Xi,t-1 + εi,t-1      (13) 
where X consists of a set of controls, such as age, education, gender, marital status, 
height, and migrant network, and Migrant is a dummy variable taking the value one if 
person i applies for the lottery and migrates in the next period, and zero if they don’t 
apply for the lottery.  
 
We then consider selection into the lottery by estimating this for the comparison of all 
lottery applicants to all non-applicants, replacing the Migrant dummy variable with a 
dummy variable for applying for the lottery. We compare the income for migrants in the 
                                                 
12 This was carried out using the treatreg command in STATA. 
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12 months prior to migration to the income of non-applicants in 2003, which corresponds 
to a similar reference period. The coefficient β then indicates whether migrants or 
applicants earned more or less prior to applying for the lottery than non-applicants, 
conditional on their observed characteristics. As with the non-experimental estimators, 
we carry out this analysis for the two groups of non-applicants: all individuals aged 18-
45, and the set of pseudo-applicants. 
 
The first two columns of Table 6 report the results of estimating equation (13), 
comparing migrants to all 18-45 year old non-applicants. The coefficient β is positive and 
highly significant. Migrants and non-applicants are seen to differ both in terms of 
observables and unobservables. Controlling for observables lowers the difference in 
lagged income from $56 per week to $29 per week. However, given that the average 
income of non-applicants in this group is $33 per week, we see that migrants earned 
almost twice as much as observationally similar non-applicants prior to them migrating. 
Similar results are shown in columns (3) and (4), where we consider selection into the 
lottery and compare all principal applicants to non-applicants. We can not reject equality 
of the coefficient on migrating in column (2) with the coefficient on applying in column 
(4). 
 
 In Columns (5) and (6) we compare migrants to the pseudo-applicant group. Despite the 
smaller sample, we still find a statistically significant positive coefficient on the 
migration dummy. The average income for the pseudo-applicants was $61 per week, so 
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migrants are estimated to have earned over 35% more than observationally equivalent 
non-applicants in the pseudo-applicant group. 
 
In the last two columns of Table 5 we modify equation (13) to examine whether there is 
selective compliance to the treatment of winning the lottery, comparing the pre-migration 
incomes of lottery winners who migrate to lottery winners who had not migrated at the 
time of the survey. The coefficient on migrating is found to be very close to zero in 
magnitude ($13 per week without controls and $7 a week with controls), and 
insignificant, with t-statistics below 0.9 in absolute value. Migrants therefore do not 
appear to differ greatly from non-migrant lottery winners in terms of unobservable 
characteristics affecting labor market earnings. 
 
These results therefore suggest that lottery applicants are positively selected in terms of 
unobservable characteristics which affect labor market earnings, but that there is little 
evidence for selective compliance to the treatment of winning the lottery, conditional on 
applying. This positive selection concurs with the differences seen in the comparison of 
the experimental and non-experimental estimates of the income gains from migration. 
 
6. Cost-of-living Adjusted Income Gains 
The experimental estimate of an average gain in income of $274 per week from migrating 
is based on comparison of incomes earned in New Zealand to incomes earned in Tonga, 
converted into New Zealand dollars using the exchange rate prevailing at the time of the 
survey, of 1.372 Pa’anga per New Zealand Dollar (P/NZD). To investigate the sensitivity 
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of the size of the income gain to adjustments for differences in the cost of living, we 
collected price data in both countries and formed several purchasing power parity 
exchange rates. 
 
The first measure, inspired by the Big Mac index of The Economist, is the PPP exchange 
rate based on the price of KFC takeaway chicken in New Zealand and a similar product 
in Tonga.13 This gives a rate of 1.669 P/ NZD. The second measure is based on food 
prices for the main foods consumed in our surveys, using the weights from the Tongan 
Consumer Price Index. This gives a rate of 1.050 P/NZD, reflecting the cheaper cost of 
some foods, such as fish, taro, and coconut in Tonga. The third measure uses food, 
transport and durable goods, giving a rate of 1.57 P/NZD, reflecting that most fuel and 
durable goods are imported into Tonga and are more expensive there. Finally, our 
preferred measure adds an allowance for housing services to the third basket, to arrive at 
a basket close to a full consumer price index. This gives a PPP exchange rate of 1.368 
P/NZD, which is remarkably close to the prevailing exchange rate. 
 
Therefore, based on these measures, one estimates that the experimental estimate of the 
income gains from migration in terms of PPP-adjusted New Zealand dollars range from 
$227.7 using the food PPP rate, to $300.44 using the KFC index. Using the preferred PPP 
rate the estimate is $273.3, which is very close to that attained using the market exchange 
rate. Hence our estimated gain seems very robust to cost-of-living adjustments. 
 
                                                 
13 There is no McDonalds in Tonga, precluding the use of a Big Mac index. However, KFC is very popular 
amongst Tongans in New Zealand, and a close copy of KFC called “Country Fried Chicken” operates in 
Tonga with similar products.  
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7. Conclusions 
The lottery used to select migrant applicants to New Zealand from the Pacific Islands 
provides a unique natural experiment which can be exploited to estimate the income 
gains from migration and to examine how successful are non-experimental methods in 
estimating these gains. We estimate that winning the lottery increases expected weekly 
income by NZ $87, while migrating increases mean income by $274. Migration therefore 
results in an increase in work income of over 263%.  
 
Our results show selection to be important in measuring the income gains from migrating, 
with migrants positively selected in terms of both observable characteristics and 
unobserved labor market attributes such as ability and drive. Direct evidence for this is 
observed from comparisons of prior income between migrants and non-applicants. As a 
result of this selection, we find that non-experimental estimation methods all overstate 
the income gains from migration, by between 9 and 82 percent. Among the non-
experimental methods, we find that a good instrument (log distance to the office where 
ballots are deposited) works well, while a poor instrument (migrant network) works very 
badly. Difference-in-differences and propensity score matching with bias-adjustment 
work best of the non-IV non-experimental methods, but both overestimate the income 
gains from migration by around 20 percent. Nevertheless, these methods do work better 
than OLS, and are not statistically different from the experimental point estimate with our 
sample sizes.  
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TABLE 1: TEST FOR RANDOMIZATION
Comparison of Ex-ante characteristics of principal applicants in successful and unsuccessful ballots
T-test
of equality
Successful Unsuccessful of means
Ballots Ballots  p-value
Age 33.6 33.7 0.91
Years of schooling 11.9 11.5 0.37
Proportion male 0.55 0.51 0.52
Proportion born on Tongatapu 0.75 0.79 0.54
Proportion who had been to NZ before 2000 0.39 0.35 0.63
Proportion who are married 0.60 0.62 0.77
Height 171.6 169.3 0.16
Proportion selling fish in 2003 0.03 0.06 0.40
Proportion selling crops in 2003 0.22 0.26 0.52
Income in 2003/before moving 103.7 88.0 0.32
Proportion with the following family members
living in NZ at time of last application:
   Father/Father-in-law 0.38 0.44 0.45
   Mother/Mother-in-law 0.40 0.35 0.46
   Brother/Brother-in-law 0.72 0.71 0.78
   Sister/Sister-in-law 0.64 0.60 0.63
   Aunt or Uncle 0.65 0.55 0.17
Total Sample Size 120 78
Average first quarter 2005 exchange rate of 1 Pa'anga = 0.729 NZ Dollars used for 
comparing mean incomes
Sample Means
APPLICANTS
TABLE 2: SAMPLE MEANS OF EMPLOYMENT, HOURS WORKED AND WAGES
Proportion Mean hours Mean weekly income
Observations Employed worked per week from work (NZ Dollars)
APPLICANTS 198 0.723 27.3 108.9
   Successful Ballots 120 0.662 28.4 194.7
         Migrants 65 0.754 33.3 424.5
         Non-migrants 55 0.618 26.0 81.1
   Unsuccessful Ballots 78 0.731 27.1 104.1
NON-APPLICANTS 60 0.672 24.2 69.5
All Non-applicants 18-45 180 0.439 16.2 41.4
T-tests of equality of means
Successful Ballots vs
Unsuccessful Ballots 0.349 0.683 0.000
Migrants vs Non-migrant
Successful Ballots 0.111 0.086 0.000
Migrants vs unsuccessful 0.754 0.105 0.000
ballots
Pure Experimental Estimators of the Gain in Income from Migration
Intention-to-treat effect 90.6
SEE-TT 320.4
Notes:
Average first quarter 2005 exchange rate of 1 Pa'anga = 0.729 NZ Dollars used for 
comparing mean incomes
SEE-TT is the simple experimental estimator of the effect of the treatment on the treated, and
compares migrants to unsuccessful ballots.
TABLE 3: REGRESSION-BASED EXPERIMENTAL ESTIMATES
Dependent Variable: Weekly Income from Work in New Zealand Dollars
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS IV IV IV
Ballot Success Dummy 90.634 89.741 87.390
(3.68)** (3.71)** (3.89)**
Male Dummy -29.070 -23.855 -33.104 -27.772
(1.19) (1.08) (1.43) (1.33)
Married Dummy -4.493 24.535 -10.695 18.376
(0.16) (1.05) (0.40) (0.82)
Age Dummy 0.558 -0.886 0.987 -0.462
(0.34) (0.71) (0.64) (0.41)
Years of Education 13.427 4.605 12.034 3.274
(2.03)* (1.18) (1.99)* (0.91)
Born on Tongatapu Dummy 29.167 27.600 29.594 28.005
(1.55) (1.87) (1.64) (2.04)*
Height 1.281 0.381 1.249 0.353
(1.96) (0.92) (2.04)* (0.93)
Past income 0.662 0.660
(6.98)** (7.31)**
Migration Dummy 273.996 281.050 273.736
(4.46)** (4.56)** (4.99)**
Constant 104.051 -297.878 -60.422 104.051 -285.011 -48.595
(8.85)** (2.45)* (0.74) (8.90)** (2.45)* (0.66)
First stage F-statistic on 66.53 61.88 61.51
instrument:
Observations 197 191 190 197 191 190
R-squared 0.04 0.14 0.27
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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TABLE 4: NON-EXPERIMENTAL ESTIMATES
Percent difference Testing
compared to equality
experimental estimate with 273.996
Method: Estimate s.e. 273.996 T-stat
1) Using pre-migration income as the counterfactual 341.3 46.4 24.6 1.45
2) Selection on Observables: OLS regression
         oldest member aged 18-45 383.5 46.4 40.0 2.36
         all members aged 18-45 360.0 41.2 31.4 2.09
3) Difference-in-Difference Regression
         oldest member aged 18-45 375.2 46.4 36.9 2.18
         all members aged 18-45 328.5 42.8 19.9 1.27
4) Instrumental Variables using migrant network 498.8 209.6 82.0 1.07
5) Instrumental Variables using log distance to NZIS
    office 305.0 93.5 11.3 0.33
6) FIML treatment effects model using log distance 
   to NZIS office as an instrument 298.0 69.3 8.8 0.35
Notes: Experimental estimate is the IV estimate from column 6, Table 3.
TABLE 5: PROPENSITY-SCORE MATCHING ESTIMATES
Percent difference Testing
compared to equality
experimental estimate with 273.996
Estimate s.e. 273.996 T-stat
A: Matching without using past income
SATE 335.7 40.2 22.5 1.53
SATT 364.0 44.0 32.9 2.04
bias-adjusted SATT 346.3 45.4 26.4 1.59
B: Matching using past income
SATE 355.8 43.6 29.9 1.88
SATT 352.2 45.4 28.5 1.72
bias-adjusted SATT 333.4 46.2 21.7 1.29
C: Matching using past income and interactions
SATE 346.2 44.7 26.3 1.62
SATT 349.1 46.5 27.4 1.61
bias-adjusted SATT 328.6 47.3 19.9 1.16
D: Trimmed, bias-adjusted SATT using specification C
Trimming 0.01 and 0.99 328.9 47.1 20.0 1.17
Trimming 0.05 and 0.95 329.1 47.4 20.1 1.16
Trimming 0.10 and 0.90 328.5 48.3 19.9 1.13
Trimming 0.15 and 0.85 325.7 49.9 18.9 1.04
E. bias-adjusted SATT in specification C with different numbers of matches
Nearest neighbor 330.1 59.0 20.5 0.95
Nearest 2 neighbors 330.6 50.9 20.7 1.11
Nearest 5 neighbors 328.6 45.8 19.9 1.19
Nearest 10 neighbors 330.4 43.0 20.6 1.31
Notes: A matches on gender, age, marital status, years of education, place of birth and height.
B also includes past income, while C adds interactions of sex with each covariate, quartics in
age and years of schooling, and an interaction between age and years of education.
Estimation uses the 4 nearest neighbours for matching each observation, except in E.
Table 6: A Direct Look at Selection 
Dependent Variable: Labour Income prior to applying/migrating
Selection into Migration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Migration Dummy Variable 55.95 29.46 28.28 21.83 13.14 7.43
(5.30)*** (3.13)*** (2.16)** (1.97)* (0.86) (0.51)
Applicant Dummy Variable 47.12 23.06
(6.53)*** (3.06)***
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
R2 0.145 0.330 0.099 0.205 0.037 0.331 0.006 0.129
Number of Observations 234 221 366 350 120 117 119 117
Notes:
Absolute value of t-statistic in parentheses, using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
Controls include gender, age, marital status, years of education, place of birth and height. The total number
of relative types in New Zealand is also used as a control in the pseudo-applicant and lottery winner regressions.
Selection into the Lottery
Lottery WinnersPseudo-applicantsAll 18-45 year olds
APPENDIX: NON-EXPERIMENTAL REGRESSIONS
Dependent Variable: Weekly work income for Columns 1-3 and 6-8.
                              Current Weekly work income - past weekly work income for columns 5 and 6.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS OLS DD DD IV IV FIML
Dummy for Migration 383.490 385.880 360.009 375.226 328.498 498.797 304.999 298.034
(8.27)** (8.41)** (8.73)** (8.09)** (7.68)** (2.38)* (3.26)** (4.30)**
Male Dummy 176.214 75.998 162.739 80.517 200.683 97.477 97.608
(2.62)* (3.29)** (2.29)* (3.70)** (2.36)* (4.70)** (4.01)**
Married Dummy -115.798 -31.548 -125.159 -45.883 -109.672 -39.565 -39.703
(1.87) (1.15) (1.94) (1.77) (1.84) (1.60) (1.52)
Age 4.706 2.797 2.314 0.083 4.807 0.872 0.824
(1.38) (1.57) (0.67) (0.04) (1.44) (0.49) (0.45)
Years of Education -2.056 -2.589 -17.712 -2.940 -10.519 2.531 2.717
(0.18) (1.03) (1.44) (1.30) (0.60) (0.82) (0.63)
Born on Tongatapu 74.661 38.288 43.119 32.406 63.531 49.717 50.244
(1.75) (1.76) (1.00) (1.40) (1.44) (2.10)* (1.92)
Height 7.094 3.589 7.404 5.964 6.397 5.960 5.981
(2.38)* (2.56)* (2.42)* (3.89)** (2.07)* (4.29)** (4.26)**
Past Income 0.031 0.299 0.313
(0.10) (1.02) (1.24)
Constant -1,393.759 41.906 -664.329 -1,211.553 -1,022.750 -1,253.125 -1,478.666 -1,094.673
(2.88)** (9.94)** (3.09)** (2.36)* (3.95)** (2.47)* (3.41)** (4.22)**
Sample oldest 25-35 all 18-45 all 18-45 oldest 25-35 all 18-45 oldest 25-35 all 18-45 all 18-45
Instrument network log distance log distance
First stage F-statistic 14.24 21.93
Number of Observations 118 230 230 116 226 116 226 226
R-squared 0.48 0.45 0.51 0.45 0.45
Note: Oldest member 18-45 in the household is used when the household doesn't contain a 25-35 year old.
Robust t statistics in parentheses
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* and ** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels respectively.
